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NS2 Code for Blackhole Attack (multiple blackholes) in AODV Protocol

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Workshop on Cyber Security and Forensics (16th to 20th August 2016) http://svecw.edu.in/docs/CSEFDPCS.pdf   Workshop on Big Data Analytics (2nd to 6th August 2016) http://svecw.edu.in/docs/CSEFDPBigDataAnalytics2016.pdf The following scenario consists of 25 nodes, in which 1,7 and 13 nodes are blackholenodes and other nodes are non-malicious.           To create multiple blackhole   attackers in AODV protocol     i)              In aodv.h the following blue colour lines needs to be added to define balckhole attackers      /*        * History management        */      double                PerHopTime(aodv_rt_entry *rt); nsaddr_t malicious1; nsaddr_t malicious2; nsaddr_t malicious3;     ii)             In   aodv.cc the following blue colour lines needs to be added to initialize the attackers   int AODV::command(intargc, const char*const* argv) { if(argc == 2) { Tcl&tcl = Tcl::instance(); if(strncasecmp(argv[1]

Routing misbehavior detection and reaction in MANETs

Abstract: Traditionally, routing protocols for mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) assume a safe and a cooperative network setting. In practice, there may be malicious nodes attempt to disrupt the network communication by launching attacks on the routing protocol itself. Protecting the route from malicious attacks is an important yet challenging security issue in mobile ad-hoc networks. In this paper, we proposed challenged node technique is to detect and react on the adversary nodes at the route discovery phase. In challenged node technique, any intermediate node, new route reply verifies with next hop node challenged replay by its mitigate neighborhood nodes. In essence, new route replay verification algorithm describe about how efficiently it detects the malicious node in route discovery process. Eventually our simulation results are shown that challenged node technique has better malicious node detection probability and packet delivery ratio.  http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xp

Taxonomy of Network Layer Attacks in Wireless Mesh Network

Abstract: Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) network layer attacks mainly occur due to in secure multi_hop communications. WMN lacks robust security services to protect multi_hop communications and no proper attack analysis has been taken place.   Most of the existing techniques protect WMNs only from single adversary node, but these techniques are failed to protect against multiple colluding attacks. This is mainly because no proper attacks classification available in WMN. To overcome these problems and strengthen the future solutions, we have done clear analytical survey on network layer attacks in WMN. Eventually, we have come up with taxonomy of network layer attack. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-30111-7_90

Hierarchical Wireless Mesh Networks Scalable Secure Framework

Abstract: Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are more scalable than any other wireless networks, because of its unique features such as interoperability, integration and heterogeneous device support. All these features are more vulnerable to various types of attacks due to lack of robust security frameworks in WMNs. Thus, protect the scalability features of WMNs against adversary nodes is a major issue. In this paper, we have designed Scalable Secure Framework (SSF) to secure the scalability features in WMNs. In which, we have proposed two algorithms: a new router authentication and router deauthentication in backbone mesh. SSF secures the heterogeneous client networks (802.11s and Wi-Fi) communications in client mesh. Our security analysis on SSF proves that WMN is effectively protected from multiple colluding attacks.  Keywords: authentication , heterogeneous, scalability, interoperability , deauthentication Scalable Secure Framework (SSF): PDF