Routing misbehavior detection and reaction in MANETs



Abstract:

Traditionally, routing protocols for mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) assume a safe and a cooperative network setting. In practice, there may be malicious nodes attempt to disrupt the network communication by launching attacks on the routing protocol itself. Protecting the route from malicious attacks is an important yet challenging security issue in mobile ad-hoc networks. In this paper, we proposed challenged node technique is to detect and react on the adversary nodes at the route discovery phase. In challenged node technique, any intermediate node, new route reply verifies with next hop node challenged replay by its mitigate neighborhood nodes. In essence, new route replay verification algorithm describe about how efficiently it detects the malicious node in route discovery process. Eventually our simulation results are shown that challenged node technique has better malicious node detection probability and packet delivery ratio. 

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=5578729&tag=1

Comments

  1. UnknownOctober 16, 2014 at 9:51 AM

    nice work
    i m impressed with your research
    i have to identify misbehavior with your approaches and classify with SVM (support vector machine) is machine learning techniques...
    so could you help me in my research and please send me your existing work...
    hope so you forward me..
    my mail id is nirav402@gmail.com

    regards and thank you
    Nirav Patel

    ReplyDelete

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