Intrusion Detection Technique for Wormhole and Following Jellyfish and Byzantine Attacks in Wireless Mesh Network

Abstract

Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have emerging application because of its ad-hoc features, high internet bandwidth capability, and interoperable with various networks. However, all features of WMNs vulnerable due to their inadequate security services, and most of the existing techniques protect WMNs from single adversary node, but failed to protect colluding attacks. We proposed new Intrusion Detection (ID) technique, to protect the WMNs from wormhole attack (colluding attack) and following jellyfish and byzantine attacks. The proposed ID technique works based on different delays such as initial end-to-end packet delay, average end-to-end packet delay, and worst case end-to-end packet delay because wormhole attackers attract the network nodes by sending lower latency. Eventually, simulation results show that, our ID technique improves throughput of the network, when source and destination nodes detect and isolate (select new path which does not contain adversaries) the adversaries in wormhole attack and its following attacks.

Intrusion Detection Technique for Wormhole and Following Jellyfish and Byzantine Attacks in Wireless Mesh Network

Comments

  1. leevaFebruary 19, 2014 at 12:02 PM

    hello sir can you help in implementing gray hole attack , it would be helpfull if u do so or can u share any link which can help me , plz mail at amenable.aman@gmail.com

    ReplyDelete
  2. UnknownJune 1, 2014 at 11:59 PM

    plz send me the tcl file for wormhole attack on manju.ojha90@gmail.com

    ReplyDelete
  3. UnknownJune 18, 2014 at 4:33 AM

    This comment has been removed by the author.

    ReplyDelete
  4. UnknownOctober 29, 2014 at 5:15 AM

    hello sir can you help in implementing gray hole attack , it would be helpfull if u do so, plz send me the modifications required to implement wormhole attack on aodv in ns2 at svarikagoyal@gmail.com

    ReplyDelete

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