MAC layer security issues in wireless mesh networks

Abstract:

 Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising technology for a broad range of applications due to their self-organizing, self-configuring and self-healing capability, in addition to their low cost and easy maintenance. Securing WMNs is more challenging and complex issue due to their inherent characteristics such as shared wireless medium, multi-hop and inter-network communication, highly dynamic network topology and decentralized architecture. These vulnerable features expose the WMNs to several types of attacks in MAC layer. The existing MAC layer standards and implementations are inadequate to secure these features and fail to provide comprehensive security solutions to protect both backbone and client mesh. Hence, there is a need for developing efficient, scalable and integrated security solutions for WMNs. In this paper, we classify the MAC layer attacks and analyze the existing countermeasures. Based on attacks classification and countermeasures analysis, we derive the research directions to enhance the MAC layer security for WMNs.
http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/proceeding/aipcp/10.1063/1.4942710

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